The fool says in his heart,"The fool says in his heart, 'The fool says in his heart, "There is no epistemology."'"

Call me a probablist, because I think it probable that I am not an empiricist. Who is, really? The problem with empiricism is that it is not verifiable empirically.

"The only reliable knowledge is empirically verified knowledge."

Really? Reliably? Do you know that empirically?

"No, but it is probably reasonable."

Yes, that is why I am a probablist, but, no, empiricism is not reasonable. I do not think it probable that the only reliable knowledge is empirically verified knowledge, because both such a notion is empirically unverifiable and, it seems to me, probably very close to being true. I do not think it is true, exactly, so much as I think that empirically verified knowledge is more reliable than knowledge verified by other means--except, of course, by means of reason, which is verifiable only by means of logical proof, which, strictly speaking, is not operable in so vast a scope of human knowing that it is practically irrelevant to it.

...unless I am missing something. And I probably am.

My point, exactly.

I am probably also correct to think that empirical evidence and reason are more reliable than, say, other means of knowing--at least to the extent that I mean this probabalistically. Knowledge amenable to logical proof and empirical evidence probably has a better track record than, say, intuition or religious revelation. Even Moses surely thought, had he the cultural warrant even to think of such things, that claims to revelation, in the aggregate, on average, were abysmally unreliable. This is at least true to the extent that only the tiniest fraction of the going revelation in those days bore a testimony to YHWH, or Elohim--or whatever the name of whom he heard on Mount Horeb in the earthquake, thunder, lightning, and smoke that probably did not happen, anyway, it seems to me. Yes, even Moses, by means of the exception, thought the rule certain that revelations, in general, were unreliable--or, rather, reliably false; or at least significantly skewed enough to deserve stoning.

Amen, but for the stoning. Except his exception probably followed the rule, and was no exception at all. I have empirical evidence and reasons for thinking this, but evidence and reason are poor excuses for empiricism and rationalism, whether respectively or not. Reason and evidence only make me think it highly probable--so probable as to be practically certain--that no revelation of any existent god came to Moses on Mt. Sinai.

You have your reasons to think differently, I know, but I do not think you a rationalist for it.

I wish this confession would finally lay the insinuation or implication that I am an empiricist to rest, but it probably will not. Evidentiary and rational appeals that claim priority over revelational ones will forever smack of empiricism and rationalism--except, of course, to revelationists who make them against what they consider to be false revelations. For example, many an instance have I heard Baptists, Pentecostals, Catholics, and Presbyterians state their reasons, including good evidence, for thinking the Golden Tablets of Moroni fraudulent. Appeals to one revelation against another were never so conclusive as fistfuls of evidence, were they ready at hand.

Since we then apparently use evidence and reason similarly, depending on the target, perhaps neither of us is an empiricist or rationalist, no matter how much we smack of it to the persons whose probably or practically certainly false revelations we oppose on evidentiary and reasonable grounds. I think the evidence and reason you use against your religious antagonists is probably more reliable than the revelations they claim. But I do not therefore think you an empiricist or rationalist. Neither am I, even though I think my reasons, which are similar to yours against what you consider to be false revelations, probably debunk your revelations, too.

But probabilities lie in the eye of the beholder--rather, are captive to the emotional commitments of those who know humanly, so humanly. That is a point that neither radical religionists nor fundamentalistic atheists consistently grasp. I am not a fundamentalistic atheist, thank God, and I am not a religionist, by George. I understand that human knowing is so probably a function of neither empiricism, nor rationalism, or supernaturalism as to be practically certain. The fool says in his heart, There is no God, just as, I think, he says there is one. And God forbid that I forget the fool who says she does not know.

So, do not, in fact, call me a probabalist. Due to my experiences, perceptions, observations, reasons, and evidences, I do not think some things to be probable so much as I am emotionally committed to things that seem highly probable to me. Call me, then, a probablistic emotionalist. Call me human. Call me mammal. Call me Tim.

Hi. Nice to meet you, too.